Chapter 8 Key debates
Topic |
‘Legislative Freedom in the United Kingdom’ |
Author/Academic |
Richard Ekins |
Viewpoint |
Evaluates the claims that the legislative freedom of the UK Parliament is limited by: Scottish devolution; the duties with respect to EU law laid down in the s 2 European Communities Act 1972; the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998; and judicial assessments of whether the process of producing particular legislation adhered to the rule of law. |
Source |
(2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 582–605 |
Topic |
‘Revisiting the “Manner and Form” Theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ |
Author/Academic |
Han-Rhou Zhou |
Viewpoint |
Assesses whether the theory that UK statutes are only valid if they have been subjected to formal or procedural ‘manner and form’ conditions is compatible with parliamentary sovereignty by examining: (1) the lessons that can be learned from cases in Commonwealth jurisdictions on the binding effect of manner and form conditions; (2) the treatment of manner and form theory by the House of Lords’ judgment in R (on the application of Jackson) v Attorney General; and (3) the views of Parliament and senior officials of the legislative branch. |
Source |
(2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 610–638 |
Topic |
‘Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypotheses’ |
Author/Academic |
Jeffrey Jowell |
Viewpoint |
Reviews the jurisdiction of the courts over Acts of Parliament in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998 and other developments. |
Source |
[2006] Public Law 562 |
Topic |
‘R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms’ |
Author/Academic |
Nicholas Aroney |
Viewpoint |
This article sets out the two competing syllogisms put forward by the parties in R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (2017) on whether the UK’s power to withdraw from the EU could be exercised by Crown prerogative or required authorization by Act of Parliament. The author argues that the Supreme Court formulated a third syllogism, and explains how this avoided the dualist approach to domestic and international law. |
Source |
(2017) 80 Modern Law Review 726–745 |