Chapter 1 Key debates

Introduction to constitutional law

Topic

‘What is a Political Constitution?’

Author/Academic

Graham Gee

Viewpoint

Analyses the notion of a ‘political constitution’ as it purports to describe the constitution in a jurisdiction, such as the UK, which lacks a legal constitution. Compares the accounts of the UK Constitution by JAG Griffith, Adam Tomkins, and Richard Bellamy.

Source

(2010) 30(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 273–299

Topic

‘Emotions in Constitutional Design’

Author/Academic

András Sajó

Viewpoint

Examines the role of emotions in developing the culture of constitutionalism out of which formal constitutions are devised or interpreted. Discusses how emotions operate at a social level, and how regulation may be conceived as emotional restraint.

Source

(2010) 8(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 354–384

Topic

‘Two Doctrines of the Unwritten Constitution’

Author/Academic

Pavlos Eleftheriadis

Viewpoint

This article analyses the parties’ arguments in R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, on whether parliamentary authorization was required for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU, to examine the nature of the clash between two rival views of the unwritten constitution, pertaining to ‘simple sovereignty’ and the ‘legal constitution’.

Source

(2017) 13(3) European Constitutional Law Review 525–550

Topic

‘Reforming an Unwritten Constitution’

Author/Academic

Jack Beatson

Viewpoint

Discusses constitutional reform in the UK since 1997, looking at government initiatives and the roles of parliamentary committees such as the Joint House of Lords and House of Commons Committee. Summarizes developments since 1997, subdivided into the periods 1998–2003, 2003–7, July 2007–March 2008, and March 2008–present. Provides an assessment of the process of reform.

Source

(2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 48–71

Topic

‘Classification of Constitutions’

Author/Academic

Neil Walker

Viewpoint

Argues that unitary conception of constitution is very flexible. Fundamental limits set by unitary conception are not great. Competition between state and other authorities militates against transformation of unitary conception.

Source

[2000] Public Law 384–404

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