Chapter 52 Chapter Summary

A moral saint, as Wolf defines it, is someone who strives to be as morally good as possible. Although such an ideal might seem worth striving for, Wolf argues that moral sainthood is, in fact, not an attractive ideal. Wolf distinguishes between two different models of moral sainthood. The Loving Saint is someone whose happiness consists in the happiness of others. The Rational Saint also pays little attention to her own happiness, instead attaching overriding importance to the concerns of morality. The Rational Saint is committed to doing her moral duty for the sake of her duty. She retains some non-moral and even selfish desires but, out of duty, does not act on them. Although these different models will appeal to different thinkers—utilitarians will be attracted to the Loving Saint and Kantians, to the Rational Saint—she claims that neither of them presents us with a desirable ideal.

Wolf argues that there are many non-moral goods in which moral saints would not be willing or able to partake. Moral saints would spend the large majority of their time improving the lives of others, and thus would have little time to read interesting books or to create or appreciate art, cuisine, or music. Furthermore, as moral saints would take great care not to cause offense, they would be unlikely to have a dry, sarcastic wit and will hence be rather bland. Wolf claims that although an acceptable moral theory should render the idea of a moral saint coherent, moral sainthood turns out to be a life not worth striving for. Given that we would not wish moral sainthood for our friends, our children, or ourselves, Wolf concludes that morality should play only a limited role in our lives.