**Chapter 4: Mind and Body**

**Test Bank**

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 1

1. The connectionist claims that the mechanical and physical interactions that occur in the brain determine the types of behavior that computers are capable of processing.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 2

2. Descartes said there were two types of substances: mind or mental substance and body or physical substance.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 3

3. Ryle believed that it was a mistake to think that “the mind” and its events were some strange and mysteriously private sort of thing behind our behavior when, in fact, the mind was the pattern of our behavior and not “behind” behavior at all.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 4

4. J. J. C. Smart argued that the identity theory was false because it was incompatible with modern science.

a. True

\*b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 5

5. Freud claimed that everything mental was knowable and therefore that surely everything “in the mind” could be described incorrigibly.

a. True

\*b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 6

6. Thomas Nagel argued that it was consciousness that made the mind–body problem so “intractable.”

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 7

7. Functionalism is the view that minds are produced by the relations between parts not particular kinds of material.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 8

8. Merleau-Ponty believed that there should be a sharp distinction between mind and body.

a. True

\*b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 9

9. Philosophers refer to the ability of knowing one's own mind by simply paying attention as Privileged access.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 10

10. Freud’s concept of the unconscious considers all thoughts that we are aware of at the moment and know everything about.

a. True

\*b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 11

11. Strong behaviorists believe that there are no mental events.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 12

12. Epiphenomenalism does not allow for causal interaction.

a. True

\*b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 13

13. The “official doctrine,” hailing from Descartes, states that everyone has a body and a mind and that at the death of the body the mind (soul) continues to exist.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 14

14. According to Ryle, attributing a mental property to someone is logically equivalent to saying that the person will act in a certain way.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 15

15. Philosophers of the mind and neuroscientists now understand the function of sleep.

a. True

\*b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 16

16. According to eliminative materialists, our increasing knowledge of the workings of the brain will outmode our “folk-psychology” talk about the mind and we will all learn to talk the language of neurology instead.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 17

17. Nagel pointed out that if we try to imagine what it is like to be a bat, the best we can do is imagine what it is like for *us* to be bats (which isn’t the question).

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 18

18. Husserl described consciousness as a kind of container in which one finds ideas, thoughts, feelings, desires, and so forth.

a. True

\*b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 19

19. Schopenhauer was thought to have refuted the “picture theory of thinking” in 1819.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: true-false**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 20

20. The “Chinese Room” is a thought experiment designed by John Searle to show that a mind is not like a computer because, although both minds and computers manipulate formal symbols, only minds are capable of understanding what the symbols mean.

\*a. True

b. False

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 1

1. Behaviorism is the idea that \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. all of our mental acts are knowable

b. our mental acts determine our behavior

\*c. only what is observable can be used as evidence in research regarding humans

d. the mind and body causally interact

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 2

2. The key to Ryle’s analysis is \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

\*a. disposition

b. dualism

c. functionalism

d. identity theory

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 3

3. Descartes was a \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. Devout buhddist

b. monist

\*c. dualist

d. pragmatist

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 4

4. The quote below belongs to\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ .

“Since brains do produce minds, and since programs by themselves can’t produce minds, it follows that the way the brain does it can’t be by simply instantiating a computer program.”

a. Gilbert Ryle

b. Rene Descartes

\*c. John Searle

d. Paul M. Churchland

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 5

5. If you believe that Data, the android on the TV show *Star Trek*, is sentient and conscious, even though his “brain” is made out of silicon and metal, then you would be a(n) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. eliminative materialist

b. identity theorist

\*c. functionalist

d. dualist

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 6

6. *Incorrigibility* is the term philosophers, especially Descartes, have given to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. persistent afterimages

\*b. the immediate certainty of our own conscious experiences

c. the arbitrary nature of intentional objects

d. dogmatic beliefs

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 7

7. How did Freud’s concept of the “unconscious” raise doubts about Descartes’s claim that whatever is mental can be described as incorrigible?

a. By suggesting that our ideas may not correspond to reality.

b. By suggesting that only our unconscious ideas are clear and distinct.

\*c. By suggesting that there are ideas in our minds that we don’t, and cannot, know.

d. By suggesting that no one is truly conscious and, therefore, that no mental activity can be said to be incorrigible.

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 8

8. *Intentionality* may be defined as \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. volition

b. temporality

c. privileged access

\*d. aboutness

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 9

9. Elizabeth V. Spelman uses \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ hierarchical account of the relationship between mind and body to illustrate how the problem of mind and body can impact other philosophical views.

\*a. Plato’s

b. Aristotle’s

c. Descartes’s

d. Hume’s

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 10

10. When Aristotle wrote about the soul, he was referring to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. the unconscious mind

\*b. the form of the body

c. the spirit within the body

d. the bottom of the feet

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 11

11. According to Galen Strawson, consciousness consists of two elements, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. the ego and the id

b. awareness and attention

\*c. sensations and intentionality

d. primary consciousness and subconsciousness

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 12

12. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ warns us not to slide form distinguishing between mind and body to formulating dubious views about the inferiority of some groups of people relative to others.

a. Galen Strawson

\*b. Elizabeth V. Spelman

c. David Braddon-Mitchell

d. Frank Jackson

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 13

13. The notion that a mind can be instantiated in anything that functions like a brain is called \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

\*a. multiple realizability

b. intentionality

c. incorrigibility

d. the dual aspect theory

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 14

14. According to Ryle, it is a necessary feature of whatever has physical existence that it is in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. space but not necessarily time

b. time but not necessarily space

c. neither space nor time

\*d. space and time

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 15

15. Husserl’s conception of consciousness depends on \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

\*a. intentionality

b. incorrigibility

c. dual aspect theory

d. multiple realizability

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 16

16. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ claimed that our experiences and ideas were one aspect of some events or activities of which the various chemical reactions of the brain were another aspect. This theory has often been called the dual aspect theory.

a. Descartes

b. Leibniz

c. Husserl

\*d. Russell

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 17

17. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ offered the solution that there was no mind–body interaction and that monads were not physical. God programmed us so that our mental activities and our so-called bodily activities were exactly coordinated. This is called parallelism.

a. Descartes

\*b. Leibniz

c. Husserl

d. Russell

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 18

18. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ claimed that his various fleeting thoughts could not be unified into a coherent, enduring self without the intervention of a higher power.

\*a. Descartes

b. Leibniz

c. Husserl

d. Russell

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 19

19. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ believed that belief in consciousness went back to the ancient days of superstition and magic.

\*a. John Watson

b. Gilbert Ryle

c. Galen Strawson

d. Bertrand Russell

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 20

20. Nagel claims that the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means that there is something it is like to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ that organism.

a. know

\*b. be

c. fear

d. understand

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 21

21. Descartes’s account of mental changes causing bodily changes, and vice versa is called \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. parallelism

b. functionalism

\*c. causal interactionism

d. epiphenomenalism

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 22

22. Behaviorism \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

a. embraces dualism

\*b. rejects dualism

c. provisionally accepts dualism

d. is another way to talk about dualism

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 23

23. Ryle discussed \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, which generally means to mistake one type of thing for another.

a. concept mistake

b. metaphysical mistake

c. epistemological mistake

\*d. category mistake

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 24

24. According to Ryle, a(n) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ is a tendency for something to happen given certain conditions.

a. attitude

\*b. disposition

c. behavior

d. determination

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 25

25. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ argued that because the two languages that we could use to describe mental-neurological events were so different, the thing(s) that they referred to must be different as well.

a. Gilbert Ryle

b. Paul Churchland

\*c. Jerome Shaffer

d. J. J. C. Smart

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 26

26. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ argues that, sensations are nothing over and above brain processes.

a. Gilbert Ryle

b. Paul Churchland

c. Jerome Shaffer

\*d. J.J.C. Smart

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 27

27. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ believed that with our increasing knowledge of neurology, our ordinary language about human behavior would be seriously revised.

a. Gilbert Ryle

\*b. Paul Churchland

c. Jerome Shaffer

d. J.J.C. Smart

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 28

28. The \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ are materialists but they are not reductionists; they believe that consciousness is a result of the complicated connections that go on in the brain.

\*a. connectionist

b. functionalist

c. behaviorist

d. eliminative materialist

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 29

29. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ had a view similar to those of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, he argued for what he called "cognitive experience."

a. John Watson

b. Gilbert Ryle

\*c. Galen Strawson

d. Bertrand Russell

**Type: multiple choice question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 30

30. David Chalmers has made use of the notion of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to challenge physicalist views of the mind.

a. dualism

b. infinity

c. matter

\*d. zombies

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 1

1. The dual aspect theory seems similar to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a unified body. What are the differences and similarities in these views? Could these theories be combined in an interesting way? Why or why not? Where does the identity theory fit in? How does it compare with the other two accounts?

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 2

2. The argument for functionalism is ultimately concerned with the relations between elements of the brain; mental acts occur as a “function” of elements. Logical behaviorism claims that the mind is only the “pattern” of our behavior. What is different between these two accounts? What is similar about these accounts? In what ways are they using the same ideas to provide different accounts of the mind?

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 3

3. Can an adequate behaviorist account of a nonhuman animal’s consciousness be given? A sparrow’s? A dog’s? A chimpanzee’s? If behaviorism fits some of these cases and not others, how would you separate them?

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 4

4. Write your account of a debate between Ryle and Nagel on the question of the nature of consciousness. Who do you side with, and why?

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 5

5. Explain Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Does this solve the mind–body problem? If so, how? If not, why not?

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 6

6. Why do you suppose it was much easier for Descartes to prove the existence of his own mind than anyone else’s? Why was Descartes’s proof of his own mental existence foundational? How did he eventually argue for the existence of other minds?

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 7

7. Differentiate between two senses in which an occurrence was said to be explained, according to Ryle. For instance: Why did the glass break? One explanation is “because a stone hit it,” and another is “because it is brittle.” Which explanation is causal, and which is expressing an underlying law like proposition? How did Ryle apply this concept of “different senses of an explanation” to the concept of “disposition” in his analysis of the mind?

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 8

8. Differentiate between the two senses of the meaning of “identity,” that is, empirical identity could be discovered through observation, experimentation, and experience, whereas logical identity is about synonymous terminology.

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 9

9. Why do eliminative materialists believe that a smooth intertheoretic reduction between folk psychology and neurobiology is not possible? They don’t think that mental states, such as thoughts, desires, fears, beliefs, and so forth, match up in a one-to-one correspondence to brain states (i.e., particular patterns of neuronal firings). Paul Churchland, for one, was convinced that folk-psychological terms were not simply *incomplete* representations of our inner states but rather that they were *mis*representations, in the way *phlogiston* was. Use the phlogiston example to argue the eliminative materialist’s case that the poverty of our current conceptual framework will be overhauled with the advancement of neuroscience.

**Type: essay/short answer question**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 10

10. In which sense do identity theorists such as J. J. C. Smart and their critics such as Jerome Shaffer mean that “thought” and “brain process” are or are not, identical? Hint: Is it correct to say that the terms *water* and *H2O* are synonyms, or do water and H2O have different properties (e.g., water is wet, but an H2O molecule is not wet) and do not, therefore, have the same meaning?

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 1

1. Merleau-Ponty attacked \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ from the side that has so far seemed least controversial, the idea that the human body is just another “bit of matter.”

**a.** dualism

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 2

2. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ is the “immediate” certainty that you feel in the case of your own conscious experience.

**a.** Incorrigibility

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 3

3. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ complained that \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ started with behavior, either human behavior or computer behavior, and claimed that understanding human consciousness was just a matter of finding the right “program” for that behavior.

**a.** Connectionists, functionalists

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 4

4. Shaffer argues that no amount of research could possibly show that \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ have the same properties.

**a.** brain processes, thought

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 5

5. The \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ denied dualism by insisting that mental terms referred to a neurological process that scientists someday would be able to specify precisely.

**a.** identity theory

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 6

6. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ proposed to defend materialism without claiming an identity between what we call “mental states” and the workings of the brain.

**a.** Eliminative materialism

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 7

7. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, in all forms, becomes nonsense in one’s own case when one is trying to understand and talk about one’s own mental states.

**a.** Behaviorism

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 8

8. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ believed that with our increasing knowledge of neurology, our ordinary language would be seriously revised.

**a.** Paul Churchland

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 9

9. In reference to the “contents” of consciousness philosopher William James developed this popular phrase, \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

**a.** stream of consciousness

**Type: fill-in-blank**

**Title:** Chapter 4 Question 10

10. For \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, mental events and physical events were different aspects of the same “something,” in his case, the same substance.

**a.** Spinoza