1. Beyond (bounded) rationality, what alternative models for human decision-making can you think of?
	1. These are the examples in the chapter, but students can think of others: In some cases, it seems more accurate to describe people’s decisions as driven by emotions, considerations of appropriateness, as people act in ways that they think are normal; or simply as the result of authority, when someone tells someone else what to do.
2. Explain how roads can be all four different types of goods.
	1. Examples are best, e.g.:
	2. Public: well-maintained highways free and open to anyone (nonexcludable, nondepletable)
	3. Club: roads in a private golf club (excludable, nondepletable)
	4. CPR: dirt roads in a poor community (nonexcludable, depletable)
	5. Private: a single-lane driveway to a house (excludable, depletable)
3. Can you think of examples of the tragedy of the commons that are not like the prisoner’s dilemma?
	1. Any situation where the two mechanisms are not quite the same; e.g. where there are repeat interactions in the Tragedy situation (the classical prisoners dilemma has no repeat interactions).
4. What does the case study of Maasai rangeland privatization teach you about the strengths and limitations of collective action models?
	1. Some version of: privatization is leading to fragmentation of communal lands (i.e. parts of the range lands are fenced-off for private use), which limit the movement of animals and compromise the key strategy to pastoral success in environments where grazing and water resources are scattered variably and unpredictably across a vast landscape. This illustrates the limits of (poorly conceived) privatisation as a strategy for enhancing food production and food security in a context where these depend on pastoralism.
5. If you analyse the case of overfishing as a collective action problem as a prisoner’s dilemma, what would you suggest as solutions based on the premises of the model? Would these solutions change if you think the situation reflects free riding, or Hardin’s mechanisms?
	1. For prisoner’s dilemma: Alter payoff matrix to incentivise cooperation over defection; Change critical interaction patterns, e.g. by facilitating repeat-interactions.
	2. For free riding: Privatisation: make benefits excludable and costs individual; Monitoring and third-party coercion: increase costs of non-cooperation; Reduce group size (decentralise).
	3. For Hardin: Privatisation: make costs individual; Third-party coercion: create short-term, individual costs to non-cooperation; Information campaigns: emphasize the impact of the long-term costs