Freedom of the Will and Determinism

48. Baron d’Holbach: We Are Completely Determined

  1. What is d’Holbach’s argument that we do not have free will? Do you think the argument is sound? Explain.
  2. Why does d’Holbach maintain that choice does not prove the free agency of man?

49. William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

  1. According to James, how does indeterminism (randomness) make free will possible? Do you agree that it does? How can randomness make someone free to act as he or she sees fit?
  2. According to James, what are the unpleasant implications of determinism?

50. Roderick M. Chisholm: Human Freedom and the Self

  1. How does Chisholm distinguish between event causation and agent causation? Why is this distinction important to Chisholm’s argument for free will?
  2. Do you find Chisholm’s argument against compatibilism persuasive? How might a compatibilist respond?

51. Harry Frankfurt: Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

  1. How does Frankfurt’s compatibilism differ from traditional compatibilism? Is it more plausible than the traditional view? Why or why not?
  2. Would you say that a woman acts freely even if her second-order desires are not her own (due to, say, drug addiction)? Would such a case be a genuine counterexample to Frankfurt’s compatibilism? Explain.

52. David Hume: Liberty and Necessity

  1. According to Hume, under what conditions does a person act freely? Is his view plausible? Can you think of a situation in which a person meets Hume’s requirement for free action but still is not free?
  2. Does Hume think that persons can ever be legitimately praised or blamed for an action? Why or why not?

53. W.T. Stace: Compatibilism

  1. What is Stace’s conception of freedom? Do you think it accurately captures what we mean by free actions?
  2. Do you think Stace’s analysis successfully reconciles free will and determinism? Why or why not?
Back to top