Turning the Trolley, Judith Jarvis Thomson

In this follow-up to the previous chapter, Thomson reconsiders the trolley problem years later. Now we are to imagine ourselves as a bystander, rather than the driver, and Thomson describes two separate cases. In the first situation, as the bystander, you have two options: you can (i) do nothing, allowing the trolley to run straight and five people to die, or (ii) throw a switch to turn the trolley to the right, which will cause one person to die. Similarly to the trolley case in the previous chapter, most people believe that option (ii) is morally permissible. In the second case, as the bystander, you have three options. You can choose either option (i) or (ii) above or you can choose option (iii), throw the switch to turn the trolley to the left, which will cause it to run you over, killing you. Thomson points out that although it would be admirable to choose to give your life to save the five workers, it would not be morally required. In the second situation, choosing option (ii) just means making another person pay the cost of a good deed instead of paying the cost yourself, which is not acceptable. But if option (ii) is not acceptable in the second scenario, then it seems that it should not be acceptable in the first either. If turning the trolley is not permissible, then the trolley problem is a nonproblem.

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